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The success in marketing original issue high-yield bonds has generated
significant interest in their default experience. Studies comparing defaults
to the par value of outstanding issues such as Altman (1987), Altman and
Nammacher (1985), and Weinstein (1987) have found relatively low default
rates. However, these studies understate default rates because of the rapid
increase in the par value of outstanding issues and because cumulative default
rates increase with years from issuance. Two recent studies by Altman (1989)
and Asquith, Mullins and Wolff (AMW) (1989) have corrected these problems by
using aging analysis to follow rated nonconvertible high-yield bonds over
time; they find cumulative default rates for such bonds I0 years after
issuance exceeding 30 percent.
This study extends the literature on high-yield default rates to
convertible and nonrated securities, not examined in previous studies. The
high-yield market can be partitionedrinto rated nonconvertible, rated
convertible, nonrated nonconvertible, and nonrated convertible securities.
Other things equal, one would expect higher default risk to be associated with
higher yields; however, other things are not equal~. For example, securities
may have high yields because of differences in liquidity or differences in
conversion options. Therefore, yields reflect more than just expected default
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views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal
Reserve System. The author would like to thank Robert Chicoski, Jessica
Laxman, and Adam Rosen and Karen Trenholme for research assistance. Helpful
comments were received from Dick Kopcke, Joe Peek, Geoffrey Tootell, Rene
Stulz, and an anonymous referee.risk; they also incorporate premiums for other characteristics of individual
securities.
When the securities are partitioned by rating and convertibility, the
results of this paper show that the cumulative default rates are lower for
rated convertible securities than for rated nonconvertible securities.
Because investors value convertibility, convertible bonds carry substantially
lower coupon rates than nonconvertible bonds. These lower coupon rates may
reduce the likelihood of an issue defaulting.
In addition, this study examines nonrated securities. Many securities
are nonrated because the graduated fee structure charged by rating agencies
makes ratings prohibitively expensive for smaller issues. Despite some
potential biases that are discussed below, the default rate on nonrated
convertible bonds is significantly less than that of rated nonconvertible
securities, and the default rate on nonrated nonconvertible bonds appears to
be less than that for rated nonconvertible securities.
The next section of the paper discusses the data and shows that the
default rates for rated nonconvertible securities are higher than those for
rated convertible, nonrated convertible, and nonrated nonconvertible
securities. Each category of security is further examined for explanations
for lower default rates, in Sections II through IV. Section V estimates a
logit model that shows that default differences based on security
characteristics persist even after controlling for coupon rates and size.
Section VI summarizes the results.
I. Data and Methodology
This study examines all original issue junk bonds issued between 1978and 1988.I The starting date was chosen because the volume of issues prior to
1978 is relatively smalT, with total rated high-yield bonds issued in any year
prior to 1978 not exceeding $I billion.
The initial list ~f high-yield bonds was compiled from lists maintained
by IDD Investment Services and the Federal Reserve. (See the data appendix
for details on the data files.) From this list, securities-are dropped if
they are found to be investment-grade. Rated securities are dropped if they
are rated above BB+ by Standard & Poor’s or above Bal by Moody’s. For
nonrated securities, the firm or the underwriter was contacted to verify its
status as below-investment-grade. Where information on a security cannot be
verified, the security is dropped from the sample and is not included in any
of the tables.
The status as of December 31, 1989 of the sample of below-investment-
grade bonds is then identified. Bonds are classified as defaulted, exchanged,
called, or outstanding. Defaulted bonds are any that miss a coupon payment or
whose firm declares bankruptcy. Exchanged bonds replace original bonds and
these are followed to see if their status changes. If an exchanged bond is
neither called nor defaulted, it is classified as outstanding.
The primary sources for the status of rated bonds are Standard & Poor’s
and Moody’s publications. The few discrepancies for rated bonds were resolved
by contacting the underwriter or issuing firm. For unrated securities, the
current status of unrated bonds initially is compiled from the National Bond
Summary, default lists from underwriters, and bankruptcy fiTings with th.e
:IAs with AMW (1989) and Altman (1989), this study excludes "fallen
angels," securities that have been downgraded to below-investment-grade
status.Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The status for all unrated
securities is then verified with either the issuing firm or the underwriter.
Two hundred and eighty-eight bonds were dropped from the initial list, either
because they were investment-grade securities (179) or because we could not
verify that they were below-investment-grade securities or determine their
default status (109)2 --leading to potential biases, as discussed below~
This laborious process is necessary because of the lack of a centralized
market and of information sources. To check for similarity of results, we
compare our summary statistics for rated nonconvertible securities to those of
AMW (1989) and obtain similar results.3
Table i shows the new issues of high-yield bonds from 1978 through 1988.
The table partitions the high-yield market into four categories, based on
convertibility and whether the issue was rated. Rated nonconvertible
securities comprise 77 percent of the market value and 52 percent of the
number of bonds issued from 1978 to 1988. However, rated nonconvertible
securities were only 50 percent of the value of new securities issued prior to
1984, so that convertible securities and nonrated securities are an important
segment of the market, particularly in the early half of the sample.
2From the original list, 148 nonconvertible securities and 31 convertible
securities had an investment-grade rating. Information could not be
determined for 104 nonrated nonconvertible and 5 nonrated convertible
securities.
3The number, val-ue, and cumulative default rates for rated non-
convertible securities in this study are similar to thbse in the AMW study.
In six of the nine years, our sample has a slightly larger number of bonds,
though the small differences in total value suggest that the AMW sample’s
smaller number likely reflects omissions of relatively small issues. The
cumulative default rate for bonds issued in 1978 is 34 percent in our sample,
33 percent for AMW. Other years are generally similar, although our study
found somewhat higher default rates for securities issued in the 1980s than
did AMW.One major difference between rated nonconvertible and nonrated or
convertible securities is the average size. Nonconvertible securities are of
larger average size than convertible securities, and rated securities are of
larger average size than nonrated securities.
Table 2 provides the default rates for each of the four categories of
high-yield bonds as of the end of 1989. The cumulative default rates for
rated nonconvertible securities are much higher than for the other three
categories. Rated nonconvertible securities have higher default rates than
rated convertible securities in 10 of the 11 issue years between 1978 and
1988. Similarly, the cumulative default rates of rated nonconvertible
securities are higher than those for nonrated convertible securities in all 11
years, and higher than those for nonrated nonconvertible securities in all but
three years. The cumulative default rates for rated nonconvertible securities
are s~gnificantly different from each of the other three categories at the 5
percent level using a pairwise t-test.4 The following sections examine
possible explanations for the differences in cumulative defaults among the
four categories of high-yield bonds.
II. Differences in Defaults of Rated Convertible and Rated Nonconvertible
Securities
Table 2 highlighted the much lower cumulative default rates for rated
convertible securities compared to rated nonconvertible securities.
4A simple t-test would not be appropriate because, as AMW (1989) and
Altman (1989) have shown, default experiences differ with age. By pairing
observations by issue date, a pairwise t-test compares differehces in
cumulative default while controlling for differences highlighted in the aging
analysis.Misclassifications cannot explain the differences in default rate. Our sample
selection process required that neither Moody’s nor Standard & Poor’s cTassify
the security as investment-grade~before it could be included in the sample,
thus eliminating misclassifications. Three other explanations are possible:
convertible bonds may have fewer of the lowest grade of these below-
investment-grade bonds; convertible bonds may be called before they have an
opportunity to default; or lower interest expense as a result of the
conversion feature may significantly reduce the probability Of default.
The highest-rated bond within a category may have a significantly lower
probability of default than the lowest~rated bond; however, differences in
quality distribution do not explain the differences in default rate. Table 3
provides the rating compositions of bonds issued during the time period that
includes most of the defaults, 1978 to 1983.5 Clearly, differences in quality
among below-investment-grade bonds cannot account for the differences between
default rates for convertible and nonconvertible bonds. Between 1978 and
1983, 25 percent of the rated convertible securities and only 15 percent of
the rated nonconvertible securities had ratings below B. Since securities
with a rating below B would be those that the rating agency thought had the
highest probability of default,5 this evidence makes the results even harder
to explain because it suggests higher rather than lower expected default rates
fo~ rated convertible securities.
5The results of this table are the same if the period is shortened. For
example, between 1978 and 1981, 20 percent of the rated convertible securities
issued had ratings below B, while only 6 percent of the rated nonconvertible
securities had ratings below B.
°An alternative hypothesis is that rating agencies are unable to
accurately assess default risk in the high-yield market. This hypothesis is
explored in Rosengren (1992).Rated nonconvertible securities have many fewer issues called than do
convertible issues. Table 4 provides the number of issues called,
outstanding, and defaulted for each of the four categories of securities. For
the issue years 1978 to 1987, the percentage of rated convertible securities
that were called exceeds that for rated nonconvertible securities. The
percentage of called convertible issues is so much greater that, despite the
higher cumulative default rates for rated nonconvertible securities in five of
the six years from 1978 through 1983, in four of those six issue years rated
nonconvertible securities have a higher percentage of issues still
outstanding.
A nonconvertible issue is likely to be called if the general interest
rate level drops or if the credit risk of the issuer improves sufficiently to
permit a lower interest cost for new security issues. An additional factor
for convertible securities is that improved firm performance is likely to
increase the value of the firm’s stock, encouraging the issuer to call the
security. Consider the following simple example. Suppose that firms that
issue high-yield bonds have a probability of 0.5 of doing well in the short
run; if they do well in the short run, they have a probability of 0.5 of doing
well in the long run. If they do poorly at any time, they are in default.
Further assume that if a firm issuing a convertible bond does well in the
first period its bond is called, while a nonconvertible bond remains
outstanding. In this example, nonconvertible bonds would default 75 percent
of the time while convertible bonds would default only 50 percent of the time.
Therefore, some of the differences in default rates may be due to firms that
do well at any point in time, retire their convertible bonds, and drop out of
the sample.This hypothesis was further explored by following firms after the
convertible security was called. The 130 called rated convertible securities
were issued by 111 firms. We followed these firms on Compustat to determine
whether they had been delisted. Of the 110 firms whose status could be
determined by using Compustat, Standard & Poor’s, and Moody’s publications,
only two had been delisted by the end of 1989, and both were liquidated and
had issued only one security. Thus, relatively few firms calling convertible
securities in our sample had been delisted at a later date.
Many firms use the retirement of convertible securities to reduce their
leverage, thus reducing their probability of bankruptcy. For those called
issues listed on Compustat, an examination of the firms’ financial positions
showed that over 72 percent of the firms had a lower debt/equity ratio at the
end of the year following the call, compared to the end of the year prior to
the call. Relatively few new long-term issues were found. Most of the firms
issued short-term debt, used internal funds, or issued new equity to pay for
the retired long-term bonds.
A third possible explanation for the differences between the rated
convertible and the rated nonconvertible bonds is the difference in coupon
rates. Because investors value the conversion feature, rated convertible
bonds have a lower coupon rate than rated nonconvertible securities, other
things equal. For a given cash flow, companies will have more difficulty
paying the higher coupons, thus increasing the probability of default.7
Forty-five percent of the rated nonconvertible securities have coupon rates
7While ratings are supposed to control for factors such as coupons that
could influence the probability of default, Rosengren (1992) finds that
ratings frequently do not fully incorporate bond characteristics that affect
the probability of default.
8greater than 13 percent, compared to only 3 percent of the rated convertible
securities. Those rated convertible securities with coupon rates greater than
I0 percent have a default rate that is actually higher than the rate for the
total rated nonconvertible group. This is consistent with rated convertible
securities having a higher percentage of securities in the lowest-rated
categories, as discussed above.
Thus, the much lower default rates for rated convertible than rated non-
convertible securities may be due to both the ability to convert in good times
and the reduced pressure placed on cash flow by convertible securities, which
generally have lower coupons than nonconvertible securities. Both these
explanations should be equally applicable to nonrated convertible bonds,
examined in the next section.
III. Differences in Defaults of Rated Nonconvertible and Nonrated Convertible
Securities
Table 2 showed much lower default rates for nonrated convertible
securities than for rated nonconvertible securities. Potential bias
introduced by eliminating firms for which we have insufficient information
does not explain this difference. For nonrated convertible securities the
potential bias is relatively minor; information was not available for five of
the 248 securities on the original list. All five of these securities were
omitted because we could not verify (with the firm or the underwriter) that
they were issued as below-investment-grade securities. However, we could
track their current status; two had matured, two were outstanding, and one was
called. Thus, if these five securities were all below investment grade at thetime of issue, the default rates for nonrated convertible securities would be
slightly lower still.
Misclassification does not explain the lower default rates. The default
experiences of the nonrated convertible securities are slightly greater than
for rated convertible securities. Thus, given the rigorous screening and the
higher default rate compared to rated convertible securities, it is unlikely
that default rates for nonrated convertible securities below those of rated
nonconvertible securities can be attributed to misclassifications. However,
because nonrated convertible ratings do not exist, it is not possible to
control for quality differences within the below-investment-grade category
that might account for some of the differences in default rates.
The most obvious reasons for a lower default rate are similar to those
of rated convertible securities discussed earTier. Convertible securities
have lower coupons and many issues are called when firms do well, eliminating
securities that might have defaulted in the future if conditions worsened.
The percentages of issues called and issues still outstanding are shown in
Table 4. In all 11 years, the sum of called and outstanding issues for
nonrated convertible securities exceeds that for rated nonconvertible
securities. The nonrated convertible securities in the highest coupon
category have greater default rates than rated nonconvertible securities, even
though they have a much lower percentage of securities with coupon rates at
least 13 percent. The default rate for nonrated convertible securities with a
coupon rate equal to or greater than 13 percent was 19 percent, compared to 14
percent for rated nonconvertible securities.
In every year, the issues of nonrated convertible securities were of
substantially smaller average size than the rated nonconvertible securities
I0(Table 2). Because rating agencies’ charges are structured to be
significantly more costly for small issues, many issuers find it too costly to
apply for a rating for small issues. This diminishes their liquidity. Not
only must investors do the credit evaluation themselves, but also they may not
have the same access to information and specialized credit evaluation
knowledge possessed by rating agencies. In addition, small issues are likely
to find few dealers willing to provide a secondary market. The reduced
secondary market and the diminished investor interest as a result of small
size and limited information may make small issues sufficiently illiquid that
a premium is required. Thus, issues may be classified as below-investment-
grade because of illiquidity rather than credit risk, which may account, in
part, for their lower default rates.
A final difference between nonrated convertible securities and rated
nonconvertible securities is that nonrated convertible issues are more often
placed privately. Privately placed bonds may default less frequently because
the firms may be monitored more closely by investors.
IV. Defaults of Nonrated Nonconvertible
For completeness we have included nonrated nonconvertible default rates;
however, these default rates have a serious potential bias. No information
was available on 104 of the 386 issues on the original list, or 27 percent of
the sample. Because many issues were small and privately placed, it could not
be verified that they were below investment grade and it could not be verified
if they had defaulted. If the probability of not being able to verify the
status of the bond were independent of default rate, there would be no bias.
However, if the securities that could not be traced were more likely to have
11defaulted, then the figures reported in Table 2 for nonrated nonconvertible
securities would have a downward bias. While defaults are one possible reason
for the lack of information, most of the securities were under $I0 million and
had underwriters that could not be traced. Other than the potential sample
bias, those securities for which information was available may have lower
default rates because of the reduced liquidity of small issues and the
increased monitoring that occurs with privately placed issues.
V. Logit Analysis
Differences in default experience can be verified statistically by
estimating the following logistic model.
Io
where : Dj : i if the security defaulted; 0 otherwise
d~j = dummy for year of issue for security j issued in
year i
RCj = dummy for rated convertible securities
NRNC~ = dummy for nonrated nonconvertible securities
NRCj = dummy for nonrated convertible securities
C~ = coupon rate
Sj = issue size in $ millions
Two logit equations are estimated: the first estimates equation i
excluding size and coupon, and the second estimates equation 1. The first
logit equation, whose results are reported in the first two columns of Table
5, estimates the probability of a security defaulting as a function of the
12year of issue and of whether the security is rated or convertible. The logit
results indicate that rated nonconvertible securities have a significantly
higher default rate than the rated convertible and nonrated convertible
securities at the i percent confidence level, and than the nonrated
nonconvertible securities at the 10 percent confidence level. As expected,
the probability of default is related to the year of issue, with earlier years
having significantly higher default rates than later years. This provides
further statistical evidence that rated nonconvertible securities have higher
default rates than rated convertible securities and than those nonrated
securities for which information was available.
The third and fourth columns in Table 5 report the results of estimating
equation I controlling for the coupon rate and the size of issue, two
variables highlighted earlier. Though issue size is not significant, coupons
are significant and of the correct sign, indicating that higher coupon
payments, after controlling for type of security, are associated with an
increase in the probability of default. While the magnitudes and significance
of the effects on convertible securities drop, as might be expected since most
of the lowest coupon issues are convertible bonds, the coefficients are still
significant. Because all three dummies for security type remain significant,
size and coupon do not account for all the differences in the default
experience of the rated convertible, nonrated convertible and nonrated
nonconvertible securities relative to rated nonconvertible securities.
VI. Conclusion
The primary finding of this study is that convertible high-yield bonds
have a lower default rate than rated nonconvertible high-yield bonds. Lower
13coupon rates, and the abiTity to retire these securities if the firm does
well, are the most likely explanations for these lower default rates. We also
examine nonrated, nonconvertible securities. The status of 27 percent of
these securities could not be verified, a fact that introduces serious
potential biases, but among the securities for which information was obtained,
the default rates are lower than for rated nonconvertible securities.
14Table 1
Annual Issuance of High-Yield Bonds, 1978 to 1988
This table snows the composition of the entire high-yield market by rating category and convertibility, for bonds
verified as below-investment-grade at time of ~ssue.
Rated Rated Nonrated Nonrated
Nonconvertible Convertible Nonconvertible Convertible
Average Average Average Average
Issue Value Size Value Size Value Size Value    Size
~ear Numbe_r ~ ~ Number ~Mi_(~L~_~!:_)_. Number ~ ~ Number ~ ~
1978 53 1,486 28.0 8 204 25.5 31 923 29.8 9 88 9.8
1979 47 1,313 27.9 13 390 30.0 15 381 25.4 13 97 7.5
1980 39 1,316 33.7 61 2,504 4].0 5 54 10.8 13 180 13.8
1981 26 1,291 49.7 37 1,319 35.6 12 187 15.6 19 277 14.6
1982 42 2,713 64.6 32 1,551 48.5 16 243 15.2 17 334 19.6
1983 65 4,896 75.3 43 2,032 47.3 42 1,347 32.1 38 1,031 27.1
1984 155 11,274 72.7 26 1,318 50.7 41 1,888 46.0 14 244 17.4
1985 142 14,055 99.0 53 3,004 56.7 58 2,441 42.1 36 929 25.8
1986 207 34,157 165.0 125 6,659 53.3 28 760 27.1 51 1,307 25.6
1987 167 29,451 176.4 92 5,634 61.2 19 315 16.6 24 332 13.8
1988 157 31,708 202.0 19 1,621 85.3 15 729 48.6 9 62 6.9
15Tabl e 2
Cumulative Default Rates for High-Yield Bonds Issued 1978 to 1988
This table shows the cumulative default rates of high-yield bonds classified by rating and
convertibiTity for which complete information was available. The default status is
calculated as of December 31, 1989.
Rated                Rated                 Rated                Rated
Nonconvertible        Convertible          Nonconvertible        Convertible
Number of % of    Number of    % of    Number of    % of    Number of    % of
Year Defaults Total Defaults Total Defaults Total Defaults Total
1978 18 34.0 I 12.5 2 6.5 2 22.2
1979 13 27.7 4 30.8 3 20.0 1 7.7
1980 14 35.9 7 11.5 2 40.0 3 23.1
1981 9 34.6 3 8.1 2 16.7 4 21.1
1982 12 28.6 2 6.3 2 12.5 i 5.9
1983 22 33.8 4 9.3 6 14.3 3 7.9
1984 20 12.9 0 0 13 31.7 I 7.1
1985 11 7.7 3 5.7 5 8.6 2 5.6
1986 24 11.6 5 4.0 2 7.1 0 0
1987 I .6 0 0 0 0 0 0
1988 1 .6 0 0 0 0 0 0
16Table 3
Initial Ratings of Convertible and Nonconvertible High-Yield Bonds
1978 to 1983
This table provides the initial ratings of convertible and nonconvertible









































Status of Rated and Nonrated High-Yield Securities Issued, 1978 to 1988
This table provides the current status, as of December 31, 1989, of all high-yield securities issued between 1978 and
1988 for which complete information was available. The cumulative percentages of the called, outstanding, and defaulted
issues in a given year sum to 100 percent.
Issue    Rated Nonconvertible
Year Call Outstanding Default
Rated Convertible Nonrated Nonconvertible
Call Outstanding Default Call Outstanding Default
No, rated Convertible
Call Outstanding Default
1978 22.6 43.4 34.0 62.5 25.0 12.5 16.1 77.4 6.5 44.5 33.3 22.2
1979 34.0 38.3 27.7 61.5 7.7 30.8 40.0 40.0 20.0 53.8 38.5 7.7
1980 28.2 35.9 35.9 55.7 32.8 11.5 20.0 40.0 40.0 30.7 46.2 23.1
1981 19.2 46.2 34.6 48.7 43.2 8.1 50.0 33.3 16.7 31.6 47.4 21.0
1982 35.7 35.7 28.6 50.0 43.8 6.2 50.0 37.5 12.5 41.2 52.9 5.9
1983 10.8 55.4 33.8 20.9 69.8 9.3 23.8 61.9 14.3 18.4 73.7 7.9
1984 16.1 71.0 12.9 34.6 65.4 0 17.1 51.2 31.7 7.1 85.8 7.1
1985 6.4 85.9 7,7 24.5 69.8 5.7 6.9 84.5 8.6 16.7 77.8 5.5
1986 5.3 83.1 11.6 12.8 83.2 4.0 0 92.9 7.1 0 100.0 0
1987 0 99.4 .6 2.2 97.8 0 0 100.0 0 0 100.0 0
1988 0 99.4 .6 0 100.0 0 0 100.0 0 0 100.0 0
18Tabl e 5
Logit Results of Estimating the Probability of Default of High-Yield Bonds
This table reports the results of estimating a logit model on the 2,134 high- yield bonds
issued between 1978 and 1988 for which the status as below-investment-grade and defaulted
could be veri~fied. The limited dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the bond defaults
by December 31, 1989 and 0 otherwise. Three classification dummy variables are included,
for rated convertible, nonrated nonconvertible, and nonrated convertible bonds. A
negative coefficient on these variables indicates a-smaller probability of default
relative to rated nonconvertible securities. The first two columns show the coefficients
and standard errors of a logit model run on dummy variables for classification and year of
issue, while the third and fourth columns present the coefficients and standard errors
when the amount of the issue and the coupon on the issue are included along with the dummy
variables for year of issue and classification.
Standard Standard































































* significant at the 10 percent level
** significant at the 5 percent level
*** significant at the 1 percent level
19Appendix
The initial universe of high-yield bonds was compiled from lists
supplied by the Federal Reserve and IDD Investment Services. The Federal
Reserve began its data base on high-yield bonds in 1982 based on SEC filings,
rating agency reports, lists from underwriters, and announcements in
newspapers and trade journals. For the period from 1978 to 1981, when the
Federal Reserve did not compile a list, we used a list of high-yield bonds
supplied by IDD Investment Services that was compiled from prospectuses issued
by underwriters. Based on 1982 data for which we had both sources, the two
lists are very similar, with only a few small issues appearing on just one of
the two lists.
As a result of contacts with underwriters, we added 16 issues not
included in the Federal Reserve or IDD data base. We dropped 288 bonds
because they were investment grade or because their status could not be
verified. We dropped 179 rated bonds, 148 rated nonconvertible and 31 rated
convertible, because one of the rating agencies listed the security as
investment-quality. The primary reason unrated bonds were dropped was that
either the status or the investment grade of the security could not be
verified, resulting in dropping 104 nonrated nonconvertfble bonds and 5
nonrated convertible bonds.
Table AI shows the status of each generation of bonds.Table A]
Aged Defaults for Original-lssue, High-Yield Bonds, by Year Of Issue
Defaulted bbnds are issues that miss a coupon payment or whose firm declares bankruptcy. A "Years after Issue" value of ]
indicates the bond defaulted the year of issue. Numbers in the n column are the number of defaulted issues of that issue
year, listed by years after initial issue, and the correspondin~ value represents par value in $ millions.
Years after 1978 1979     1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 ]988
Issue n value n value n value n value n value n value n value n value n value n value n value
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 I 20 0 0 I 7 0 0
3 1 100 0 0 I 30 0 0
4 0 0 7 112 0 0 I 75
5 0 0 0 0 I 30 4 390
6 2 36 2 50 2 77 2 44
7 4 113 1 60 6 165 0 0
8 6 160 I 25 I 25 0 0
9 3 110 0 0 2 53 2 90
I0 1 15 I 61 0 0
1] 0 0 I 20
12 0 0 -
Total
Defaulted 18 554 13 328 14 387
Total
Issued
Rated Nonconvert i bl e
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 4 222
I 60 4 335 7 382
2 176 10 690 5 235
2 150 3 148 3 239
0 0 5 305 1 200
5 448 0 0 ~- -
2 273 - -
! 96 ] 75
3 227 5 885
2 225 10 1560
4 185 8 1340
I 35
9 599 12 1107 22 1478 20 1278 11      768 24    3860
0 0 0    0
0 0 I 240
I 400
I 400 1 24O


















































0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 45 0 0








0 0    3 110    5 294    0     0    0     0
26 1318 53 3004 125 6659 92 5634 19 ]621
] 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 I
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 i 12 0 0
8 0 0 1 15
9 0 0 I 10
10 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 I 150





]2 4 181    7 258    3    80    2 40    4 125
8 204 13 390 61 2504 37 1319 32 1551 43 2032
21Table A1 - continued
Aged Defaults for Origin~l-lssue, High-Yield Bonds, by Year of Issue
Years after 1978 1979     1980 1981 1982 1983


















n value n value n value
NonratedNonconvertible
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 20 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 50 0
0 0 1 I00 0 0 0 0 0
2 5 i 8 1 3 0 0 I
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
0 0 I 67 0 0
0 0 0 0 -
0 0 -
5 3 175
31 923 15 381
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 2 71 0 0
0 I 65 2 88 0 0 I 30
0 I 30 4 290 3 408 I 26
51 2 60 5 99 0 0
0 I 2 2 88 -
1987       1988
n value        n value
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0
2 23 2 50 2 76 6      167 13      565 5     479 2 56 0 0 0 0
5 54 12 187 16 243 42 1347 41 1888 58 2441 28 760 19 315 15 729
] Or 0 0
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 I
5 0 0 0
6 0 0 0
7 I 2 0
8 I 2 0
9 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
11 0 0 0
12 0 0
Total
Defaulted 2 4 1
Total
I~sued     9 88 13
Nonrated Convertible
0 0 O. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 I 50 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 1 7 I 15 0 0 0
0 1 4 I 3 0 0 0 0 I
0 0 0 I 8 0 0 2 14 0
0 2 100 0 0 0 0 I 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 - -
4 3 104 4 68 I 15 3 19 I
97 13 180 19 277 17 334 38 1031
0 o0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 14 0 0 - -
8 1 5 - -
8 2 19 0 0 0 0    0
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